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Summary The recent outbreak of Marburg haemorrhagic fever in the Democratic Republic of Congo has put the
ﬁlovirus threat back on the international health agenda. This paper gives an overview of Marburg and Ebola
outbreaks so far observed and puts them in a public health perpsective. Damage on the local level has been
devastating at times, but was marginal on the international level despite the considerable media attention
these outbreaks received. The potential hazard of outbreaks, however, after export of ﬁlovirus from its
natural environment into metropolitan areas, is argued to be considerable. Some avenues for future research
and intervention are explored. Beyond the obvious need to ﬁnd the reservoir and study the natural history,
public health strategies for a more timely and efﬁcient response are urgently needed.
keywords emerging infectious diseases, ﬁlovirus haemorrhagic fever, public health
correspondence Matthias Borchert, Epidemiology Unit, Department of Public Health, Institute of
Tropical Medicine, Nationalestraat 155, 2000 Antwerp, Belgium. E-mail: mborchert@itg.be
Introduction
In May 1999, two dozen national and international experts
and scientists spent three weeks and a hundred thousand
dollars or more to investigate an outbreak of haemorrhagic
fever (HF) in Durba, Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC), an area suffering from war and economic collapse.
Upon arrival of the team, 86 cases were suspected during the
past 4–6 months causing 58 deaths, and one death had been
conﬁrmed to be Marburg HF. It was the ﬁrst documented
community outbreak of this disease, which partially explains
the impressive expert/case ratio and the general excitement in
the scientiﬁc community.
How should such activities be judged from a public health
perspective? Given the overall precarious situation of DRC
health services, are they a waste of scarce resources, spent on
minor events of limited local importance? Are they a heroic
struggle against ‘Virus X’, the ‘Coming Plague’, a paradigm
for hazardous emerging diseases? Or are they just a job that
has to be done?
The filovirus debut
In Marburg (Germany) 1967, 21 workers of a pharmaceutical
company fell ill with a hitherto unknown disease over a
period of three weeks. At the same time, 5 similar cases were
observed in Frankfurt/Main and Belgrade (Yugoslavia). All 26
primary cases had been exposed to blood or tissues of vervet
monkeys (Cercopithecus aethiops), imported via London
from Uganda. Six secondary cases occurred among health
workers (3 by needle puncture, 1 by cut with post mortem
knife) and partners of the patients (1 by nursing care, 1 by
sexual intercourse), resulting in a total of 32 cases.
The incubation period ranged from 3 to 8 days. The clini-
cal picture consisted of fever, myalgia, vomiting and diar-
rhoea, a characteristic rash and enanthem; half of the
patients developed a conjunctivitis and 22% severe haemor-
rhagic diathesis, with bleeding from the gums, nose, puncture
lesions as well as haematemesis and melaena. Antibiotic
therapy did not change the course of the disease, but recon-
valescent serum made a ‘favourable impression’ on the clin-
icians. Under intensive symptomatic care of that time, the
case fatality rate (CFR) was 23% (summarized from Martini
& Siegert 1971; updated from Slenczka 1999).
It soon became clear that the disease was of viral origin.
The virus could be demonstrated by electron microscopy in
liver tissue, blood, throat washings, urine, etc. The Marburg
virus had an unusual size and shape: very long with a median
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length of 665 nm and maximum of 8000 nm, shaped like a
string – hence the name for the new virus family, ﬁloviridae,
with a single genus, ﬁlovirus.
Exposure to monkey blood or tissue could explain the
human cases, but the mortality among monkeys was so high
that they were an unlikely natural reservoir. Between this
initial outbreak and the Durba epidemic, only 8 further
Marburg HF cases have been described on 4 occasions: 3 were
primary cases occurring after travel in central and southern
Africa, 3 were secondary cases among caregivers, and 2 cases
occurred in a laboratory; half of the patients died (Slenczka
1999).
Ebola virus enters the stage
In August 1976, 318 cases of haemorrhagic fever, clinically
similar to those in Marburg 1967 (Piot et al. 1978), occurred
in 55 villages around the Catholic mission of Yambuku,
north central DRC. 88% of the cases were fatal. Both sexes
and all age groups were affected (Breman et al. 1978). The
mission hospital, with 120 beds and 6000–12000 patients per
month at the outpatient clinic, was the epicentre of the out-
break, from where it spread to neighbouring villages. The
level of hospital hygiene can be appreciated by the following
citation: 
‘Five syringes and needles were issued to the nursing
staff each morning for use at the outpatient department,
the prenatal clinic and the inpatient wards. These
syringes and needles were sometimes rinsed between
patients in a pan of warm water. At the end of the day
they were sometimes boiled (Breman et al. 1978).’ 
An injection at the mission hospital was the only plausible
risk factor in 26%, person-to-person transmission was likely
in 47%, and both transmission modes were possible in 14%.
The threat to health workers became apparent when 13 of 17
Yambuku hospital staff were infected and 11 died. One of the
nursing sisters from Yambuku travelled by air to the capital
Kinshasa, more than 1000 km away. She transmitted the virus
to an accompanying sister and a hospital nurse in Kinshasa;
all three died (Isaacson et al. 1978). No doubt this disease
could be transported to distant places. The origin of the epi-
demic, however, remained unclear. The virus was morpho-
logically similar to the Marburg virus: ﬁlamentous, with a
remarkable maximum length of 14000 nm (Murphy et al.
1978); immunologically, however, the virus was different. It
was named Ebola and became the second species of the
ﬁlovirus genus.
A parallel outbreak in Southern Sudan started at the end of
June 1976 in Nzara (Francis et al. 1978). For 14 cases, no
plausible source of infection could be identiﬁed. As 9 of them
worked in a cotton factory infested by rats and bats, an
attempt was made to identify the virus reservoir in these
animals, but nothing was found. The disease spread among
family members, particularly among caregivers. It was trans-
ported to Maridi, 180 km away, where it was spread by an
active teaching hospital. 76 of 230 hospital staff members
became ill, 41 died (El Tahir 1978); about 20 patients and
visitors were infected in hospital, with subsequent infection
within households. In total, 284 cases were observed in
Sudan, with a CFR of 53%.
Although there was road trafﬁc between the areas affected
by Ebola in Sudan and Zaire, no direct epidemiological link
could be demonstrated (El Tahir 1978). In fact, the viruses
proved to be two different strains, Ebola-Zaire and Ebola-
Sudan, so that the two epidemics were independent events. A
Sudanese specimen led to a nonfatal infection in a British
high biological safety laboratory (Emond 1978).
Ebola virus becomes notorious
Filovirus outbreaks created considerable interest among
virologists and experts in international health but remained
largely unnoticed by the general public. This changed drasti-
cally after 1989, when the Ebola virus occurred in quarantine
facilities for monkeys in Reston near Washington D.C.
Cynomolgus monkeys (Macaca fascicularis) imported from
the Philippines were found to be infected with a new Ebola
strain (Jahrling et al. 1990). The Reston strain, while highly
pathogenic for monkeys, fortunately was nonpathogenic for
humans, even in serocoverted animal caretakers (Centers for
Disease Control & Prevention 1990). Similar incidents
occurred in 1990 (USA), 1992 (Italy) and 1996 (USA,
Philippines). Although the transmission pattern could not be
established reliably, there was circumstantial and evidence
that transmission in monkeys could have occurred through
the air (Peters et al. 1993; Rollin et al. 1999).
Combine the high fatality rate of Ebola-Zaire infections
with possibly airborne transmission of Ebola-Reston and you
get the kind of horror scenario that fuels the interest of
media and public. The story took off in 1994 with ‘The Hot
Zone’ (Preston 1995); meanwhile millions of copies of this
thriller have been sold. Other books have followed, with a
variable balance between science and ﬁction, ‘Virus X’ (Ryan
1998) being among the better ones, and Hollywood has had
its share with the movie ‘Outbreak’.
As a consequence, the next major Ebola outbreak 1995 in
Kikwit, RDC (315 cases, CFR 81%) 
‘took place in an unprecedented atmosphere of legit-
imate news reporting and tabloid exploitation’ (Peters &
Leduc 1999b). 
Heymann et al. (1999) describe the ‘bittersweet lesson’ of
how the international press helped mobilize urgently needed
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resources, but also hindered the containment of the epidemic
and violated patients’ rights. They conclude that it is a
challenge for intervening public health specialists to make
optimal use of international media while accommodating
their needs without putting patient care, epidemic control
and research at risk.
While media attention made a difference, the course of the
epidemic was similar to that in Yambuku and Nzara/Maridi.
As the index case was a charcoal worker (Khan et al. 1999),
the source of the outbreak was thought to be in the forest.
After secondary spread in the community, the epidemic was
spread by health facilities, causing victims among patients
and staff. Initially, cases were misdiagnosed as dysentery; thus
it took several months to recognize the Ebola outbreak and
initiate an appropriate response (Muyembe-Tamfum et al.
1999a). As in Yambuku, it was the death of European nuns
that triggered the intervention. Unlike in former outbreaks,
this epidemic had not yet peaked when the experts arrived. It
was not only a challenge for outbreak containment, but also a
unique opportunity for ﬁeld research. Close contact to the
patient and his body ﬂuids, particularly during late stage of
disease, was the most important risk factor for transmission,
followed by contact during burial rites (Dowell et al. 1999).
Caregivers, be they family members or professional health
staff, were those most at risk for secondary infection. Air-
borne transmission between humans seemed nonexistent or
rare (Khan et al. 1999). Despite considerable efforts, the
reservoir host remained unknown. The development of an
immunohistochemical diagnostic test (Zaki et al. 1999) based
on formalin-ﬁxed post mortem skin snips held some promise
for surveillance, as specimen collection is simple, safe and
cheap (Lloyd et al. 1999). A diagnostic test based on ELISA
for anti-Ebola IgM became available; for seroprevalence
studies, the ELISA for anti-Ebola IgG seemed to be more
speciﬁc than the earlier indirect ﬂuorescent antibody test
(Ksiazek et al. 1999). The many lessons learnt in Kikwit have
been recently published in a supplement of the Journal of
Infectious Diseases (Peters & Leduc 1999a).
A price to pay for interfering with the biosphere?
There were three other Ebola outbreaks in Gabon between
1994 and 1997 (Georges et al. 1999) with 141 cases in total
(CFR 67%), the ﬁrst initially misdiagnosed as Yellow Fever
(Amblard et al. 1997). Primary cases were among hunters or
people who had butchered a chimpanzee found dead (WHO
1996), secondary transmission occurred to close contacts and
caregivers (family members, health workers or traditional
healers). There was considerable geographical spread within
the country, including the capital Libreville, and even expor-
tation to South Africa, leading to a fatal nosocomial trans-
mission to a nurse (WHO 1997). By genome sequencing
the virus was found to be very similar to the Zaire strain
(Georges-Courbot et al. 1997). Anecdotes of fatal epidemics
among great apes parallel to the Ebola outbreaks in Homo
sapiens were reported. All three epidemics occurred in prox-
imity to the tropical rain forest, partially in settings that
involved signiﬁcant disturbance of the forest integrity. A
hypothesis explaining the increasing number of emerging
infectious diseases by destruction of ecological niches gained
popularity. Particularly interference with the tropical rain
forest and its characteristic abundance of species would lead
to encounters with pathogens formerly separated from man’s
habitat.
The relationship between ﬁlovirus disease in human and
nonhuman primates was further clariﬁed by a single Ebola
case in Ivory Coast 1994. An ethologist studying chimpanzees
in the Taï National Park fell ill after performing an autopsy
on a chimpanzee found dead in the forest. The virus was of a
hitherto unknown strain (Ebola-Ivory Coast). The role of
apes and monkeys became clearer: the chimpanzees, observed
since 1979, had suffered from episodes of high mortality in
1992 and 1994, and dead chimpanzees had been found with
signs of haemorrhage. Consumption of Red Colobus monkey
(Colobus badius) appeared to be a risk factor for the chim-
panzees. Colobus monkeys, herbivores living in the tree
canopy, could be intermediate hosts, infected by a possible
reservoir such as arthropods, rodents or bats in the upper
strata of the forest (Le Guenno et al. 1999). Bats are among
the principal suspects (Monath 1999): ﬁrstly, they have been
present in many settings where primary cases of Ebola and
Marburg HF have occurred; secondly, after experimental
infection they maintain a high viral load without dying from
it (Swanepoel et al. 1996).
Come-back of Marburg
After Kikwit, Muyembe-Tamfum et al. (1999a) had expressed
their optimism that ‘any new Ebola outbreak hopefully will
be diagnosed at a much earlier stage’. With respect to the
Marburg outbreak in Durba 1998/99, there was indeed in-
creased awareness at the periphery: the district medical ofﬁcer
in charge repeatedly informed the intermediate level about an
outbreak suspicious of haemorrhagic fever. For reasons that
are not clear, this did not lead to an immediate response. The
total delay from the onset of the epidemic to an appropriate
intervention was at least four months, and tragically, the dis-
trict medical ofﬁcer was among the fatalities. Moreover, there
are indications that since 1994 or earlier, several small out-
breaks have occurred in the region, which all remained un-
diagnosed; a survivor of a 1994 episode now proved IgG
positive against Marburg virus. It appears that cases occurred
predominantly among men involved in pit gold mining.
Compared to the Ebola epidemics, secondary spread seems to
© 2000 Blackwell Science Ltd 320Tropical Medicine and International Health volume 5 no 5 pp 318–324 may 2000
M. Borchert et al. Filovirus haemorrhagic fever outbreaks
have played a relatively minor role (WHO 1999a,b). At the
end of the epidemic, 75 cases had been identiﬁed (CFR 83%),
most of them retrospectively based on a clinical case
deﬁnition; laboratory conﬁrmation was obtained in 9 cases
(Muyembe-Tamfum et al. 1999b; updated). Media attention
was limited as the area of the outbreak was difﬁcult to access
because of the ongoing armed conﬂict – circumstances which
also hampered the investigation.
Assessing the actual damage É
To answer the question how much effort should be put into
ﬁlovirus control and research, one should ﬁrst consider the
damage done by them. Since 1967, the year of their discovery,
1209 cases and 873 deaths due to Marburg and Ebola have
been diagnosed – compared with 13.9 million deaths caused
by HIV , another emerging virus, since the beginning of the
AIDS epidemic in the 1980s (UNAIDS 1999). Based on sero-
surveys, it has been argued that outbreaks may have remained
unrecognized (Johnson et al. 1993). But even if the reported
number of cases and fatalities were underestimated by a fac-
tor of 100, ﬁlovirus outbreaks would contribute only mar-
ginally to the global burden of disease by infectious agents.
However, two aspects deserve further attention: ﬁrst, the
importance of an outbreak at the local level, second, the
potential threat at national or international levels. The effects
of a ﬁlovirus HF outbreak on the affected population as a
whole have never been studied systematically, but there is
little doubt that they have been dramatic sometimes. Fear and
panic have ensued, occasionally leading to avoidable sec-
ondary transmission. The impact on health services, fre-
quently the epicentre of the outbreak, has been particularly
devastating. Health workers, often in a most tragic way vic-
tims and villains at the same time, have paid a heavy toll.
Many have died, others have ﬂed, some even have been
imprisoned for suspected murder of their colleagues. At
Maridi, 
‘at the height of the epidemic, the hospital was in chaos’
(Francis et al. 1978); 
‘a few patients were left neglected, a large number or
nursing staff, in panic, did not show up for work’ (El
Tahir 1978). 
In Yambuku, 
‘the people in the community had already associated the
mission hospital with the epidemic and had stopped
coming to the outpatient department. The hospital staff
… closed the hospital at the end of the month.’ 
In the absence of basic hospital hygiene and barrier nursing
techniques, this turned out to be a good idea because it 
‘essentially stopped injection-transmitted disease and the
epidemic shortly terminated’ (Breman et al. 1978). 
In Kikwit, 
‘news about the death of the health care workers …
rapidly spread … among the population … This created
great panic and mistrust in Kikwit General Hospital, and
nearly all patients ﬂed. … Health care workers also left
their posts.’ (Guimard et al. 1999).
Clearly, ﬁlovirus HF outbreaks have had most unfortunate
consequences for the health facilities involved. However, it is
important to keep in mind that the health system itself has
contributed to the secondary spread of the infection. The
most severe outbreaks have occurred where the health system
had been weakened beforehand by economic crisis, break-
down of the public sector or armed conﬂict. The surveillance
systems in place have failed to detect the epidemics in time:
deﬁcits have been observed on all levels. Either the outbreak
was not recognized or not reported at the peripheral level, or
the intermediate level did not respond appropriately. The
central level has occasionally played down the seriousness of
the situation or discouraged the disclosure of outbreak infor-
mation to the international community. Several times, an
appropriate response was initiated by the death of health
staff, after months of neglecting the outbreak in the com-
munity. The channel by which information eventually spread
was often not the ofﬁcial one maintained by the ministry of
health, but a parallel one run by missions or NGOs. As a con-
sequence of all these deﬁciencies, the chain of transmission
was not interrupted as early as possible.
Another consequence of the degraded health system is the
lack of hospital hygiene, which has lead to considerable
iatrogenic ampliﬁcation of the disease. Lack of resources,
training, supervision and motivation have all contributed to
the deplorably low standards of hygiene and medical care
observed in some places.
É and the potential threat
Marburg and Ebola HF outbreaks are very rare events with a
high case fatality rate, perceived as a severe health problem by
the population, exacerbated by a weakened health system, and
leading to further damage to this system. Nevertheless, the
extreme rarity of the disease would prevent it from obtaining a
prominent rank on the international public health agenda if
there were not the potential threat of a large future epidemic.
We have learnt that Marburg and Ebola HF outbreaks are
not conﬁned to scarcely populated remote places, but may hap-
pen in medium-size cities (Kikwit has more than 200000 inhab-
itants) and reach large centres (e.g. Kinshasa 1976, 1995,
Libreville 1996, Johannesburg 1996). There is no doubt that
within days or hours, the virus can reach any place in the
world that is part of the international air travel web. Assuming
unchanged transmission patterns, the extent to which the virus
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will spread after arrival depends largely on the capacity of the
health system to prevent and contain an outbreak.
One could argue that community outbreaks have tended to
be self-limiting so far. Nosocomial ampliﬁcation could be
rapidly interrupted when standard rules of hospital hygiene
plus barrier nursing methods were applied – and even the
nosocomial route has been self-limiting when the hospital was
abandoned. However, this could dramatically change if a viru-
lent Ebola strain evolves which is able to spread by air, as was
possibly the case in the Reston strain. It has been shown that
the Zaire strain can be transmitted experimentally to monkeys
by aerosol (Johnson et al. 1995; P’iankov et al. 1995) and it has
been suggested that airborne transmission may have happened
unintentionally to rhesus monkeys which served as controls in
a therapeutic experiment (Jaax et al. 1995). It is not at all
beyond possibility that some genetic mutation may improve
the ﬁloviruses’ ability to spread by air. Airborne inﬂuenza in
1918–19 killed 20 million people (McNeill 1976) – what would
be the toll of airborne Ebola? We are not joining those who
suggest that our species is at risk of being wiped out by
ﬁloviruses – this is an exaggeration and does not correspond
to the course epidemics usually take. However, we know that a
virus may emerge and signiﬁcantly change the global state of
health: this is one of the lessons from the HIV pandemic.
Last not least, there is the possibility of ﬁloviruses being
used in biological warfare. Given Homo sapiens’ amazing
potential for auto-destruction, the unthinkable may become
reality – some preparatory work has been done.
What is on the agenda?
Obviously, the health system in risk areas needs to be strength-
ened. It must be enabled to detect and report ﬁlovirus HF out-
breaks early, offer care to patients without putting others at
avoidable risk and interrupt the chain of transmission in the
community. Nosocomial ampliﬁcation must be avoided by all
means. A strategy of early response to suspect cases, including
conﬁrmation of fatal cases by immunohistochemistry, has
been proposed recently (Lloyd et al. 1999). Now it has to be
assured that this approach – or another one – is known and
applied by all parties intervening in the ﬁeld, including NGOs.
The challenge is to achieve these improvements in the context
of economic crisis, breakdown of the public sector and armed
conﬂict. As long as these fundamental problems prevail, only
modest progress can be expected. However, failing to make
any change at all will not only favour secondary transmission
in the community and in health facilities, but also undermine
people’s trust in their health facilities, thus inﬂicting further
damage on them.
CDC and WHO (1998) have published guidelines on how to
control viral HF in African health care settings. A great effort
has been made to adapt the recommendations to an environ-
ment where resources are scarce, and to facilitate comprehen-
sion by a large number of illustrations. This is without doubt
a useful document from the district supervisor level upwards.
However, it is a book of 198 pages – an amount of infor-
mation not easily absorbed during an outbreak. Furthermore,
the effort it takes to apply the complex rules of consequent
barrier nursing as suggested by these guidelines should not be
underestimated, particularly in settings where even the most
basic rules have not been applied before. We suggest comple-
menting this comprehensive manual by a concise protocol,
aiming at ﬁrst level health workers, concentrating on the
essentials to start with. As an example, correct use of gloves
as well as correct disposal or sterilization of needles, syringes,
and surgical instruments appears to be particularly important.
However, the particularities of viral HF control should not
distract from the general rule: Universal principles of hospital
hygiene should be applied everywhere, at any time. This
would not only reduce the risk of hospital transmission of
ﬁloviruses, but of many other pathogens such as HIV and
Hepatitis B which are probably more relevant for public
health.
As part of the international preparedness for HF outbreaks,
concise guidelines for emergency teams should also be set up,
covering epidemiological, clinical and logistical aspects of the
response, with activities ranked by priority. Once these guide-
lines are agreed upon, they should become part of the essen-
tial package to be taken to the ﬁeld.
With respect to research, the reservoir and the transmission
pattern to primary cases remain the most enigmatic aspects of
ﬁlovirus diseases. Once we know where the viruses come
from, and how they ﬁnd their way from the reservoir to the
human host, options for primary prevention may – or may not
– be identiﬁable. This knowledge could also allow making
predictions of future outbreaks should certain ecological
events happen or activities continue – such as deforestation in
the tropics.
There is no cure for ﬁlovirus HF beyond supportive
therapy. Hyperimmune serum (Kudoyarova-Zubavichene
et al. 1999), interferon (Jahrling et al. 1999), recombinant
monoclonal antibodies (Maruyama et al. 1999) and antiviral
drugs (Huggins et al. 1999) are experimental approaches to be
pursued. Blood transfusions from convalescent donors have
been tried in Kikwit, with encouraging yet statistically not sig-
niﬁcant results (Mupapa et al. 1999; Sadek et al. 1999). This
therapeutic strategy should be tested in a randomized con-
trolled trial if an opportunity presents itself; the protocol for
such a trial should be prepared in advance.
Conclusion
Research in ﬁloviruses is an investment into an uncertain
future: nobody knows how useful it will be in the end. Until
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AIDS, retrovirology was fundamental science with little
prospect to be useful for human health. The same could
become true for ﬁlovirology. Regarding intervention, the over-
all objective must be to enable the health system to cope with
ﬁlovirus HF epidemics. This includes surveillance, care and
outbreak investigation. Sustainability is a major challenge:
after Kikwit, Peters and Leduc (1999b) have observed that 
‘despite intensive training, health care workers in Kikwit
abandoned most of the improvements in medical hygiene
within 3 months of the end of the epidemic’. 
Training is essential – but what can we expect from health
workers whose salaries are not paid and who face shortages
of gloves and needles, while essential utilities like running
water and electricity break down? Peters and LeDuc continue: 
‘It is unclear [how the necessary changes] might occur
without marked economic and cultural changes’
– this looks like an understatement to us.
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